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Abstract
This article discusses the influence of policies on the development 
of biopharmaceuticals. We choose the experiences of Taiwan for our 
empirical study and focus on the evolution between 2000 and 2008; 
in the period of time the country provides an interesting example 
for further exploration of biopharmaceutical policies. Among all the 
policies, the two National Programs (National Research Program for 
Genetic Medicine and National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals) and the Law of Pharmaceutical 
Affairs showed the contrasting effects on the innovation system of 
biopharmaceuticals. As a result, the government generated very 
limited positive influence on the innovation of biopharmaceuticals.
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Introduction
This article discusses the influence of policies on the 
development of biopharmaceuticals. The concept of innovation 
system which focuses on the network of actors for the 
accumulation and exploitation of knowledge is frequently 
applied for the analysis of research, technology, development and 
innovation policies policies (RTDI) (1–4). Thus; in this article 
we establish the analytical framework upon the concept of an 
innovation system. Since biopharmaceutical is developed upon 
a specific technology (biotechnology) adopted by a particular 
sector (pharmaceuticals) and intensively shaped by national 
institutions, we consider the national, sectoral and technological 
innovation system (NSTIS) (as shown in Figure 1) as the most 
suitable conceptual framework (5).
We choose the experiences of Taiwan for our empirical study 
and focus on the evolution between 2000 and 2008; in the period 
of time the country provides an interesting example for further 
exploration of biopharmaceutical policies. During 2000 to 2008, 
the Taiwanese government promoted various policies (as shown 
in Figure 2) to support the innovation of biopharmaceuticals, 
yet there has been little success. According to Figure 2, these 
policies included R&D, regulation1 and business parks. Since 
1The Law was amended from 2000 to 2008 to add new clauses, such as the licenses of new medicines 
and data-exclusivity. As described by the Minister of the Department of Health (Intex3), he has once 
requested the Bureau to set up the agendas of the law not only to control the safeties of medicines but also 
to appropriately encourage the innovation of new biopharmaceuticals. This general direction was indeed 
consistent with the National Programs which aimed to support the growth of the pharmaceutical sector. 
Yet, we will show that after the implementation of the two policies, the effects of the two kinds of policies 
decreased rather than increased each other. 
our emphasis is the influence of policies, instead of discussing 
the detailed contents of each policy, we only choose the two 
National Programs (National Research Program for Genetic 
Medicine and National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals) and the Law of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs (typically shortened to be the Law) 
which showed the contrasting effects on the biopharmaceutical 
innovation system for in-depth study. The contents of the two 
National Programs and the Law are displayed in Table 1. Even 
though the two kinds of policies were both promoted to support 
the development of biopharmaceuticals, the effects of the two 
kinds of policies reduced each other. As a result, the government 
generated very limited positive influence on the innovation of 
biopharmaceuticals. 
We collected the first-hand resources through personal 
interviews; the list of interviewees is presented in Table 2. The 
article is structured as follows; at first we describe the ecology 
of firms. It is followed by an illustration of universities’ roles. 
Lastly, we review the influence of the two kinds of policies on the 
innovation of biopharmaceuticals.
The ecology of firms
Between 2000 and 2008, local Small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) were the pillars of innovation and manufacturing 
activities in the pharmaceutical sector. The pharmaceutical 
Multinational corporations (MNCs), which had started to sell 
their manufacturing facilities to local SMEs since the 1990s, sold 
out their manufacturing facilities. In the beginning of the 2000s 
the MNCs only operated their marketing divisions in Taiwan 
(6). 
The main business of local pharmaceutical companies was 
manufacturing pharmaceutical intermediaries and generic 
medicines. The knowledge base of these firms was chemical 
engineering rather than biotechnology. The knowledge 
accumulation of these companies was in manufacturing 
activities. However, the majority of firms still lacked financial 
resources to do innovation. They mainly targeted the domestic 
market and competed with each other on a price-base. With 
limited technological capabilities, these firms’ pharmaceutical 
products were hard to export to foreign markets (7). 
The most significant ecological change of the pharmaceutical 
sector was the emergence of new biopharmaceutical companies. 
Compared with the local companies which focused on 
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Figure 1. Relationship of National, technological and sectoral innovation 
systems and NSTIS [Source: Chung (5)]
Figure 2. The structure of the biotechnology and related sectoral polices 
in Taiwan (2000-2008)
manufacturing pharmaceutical intermediaries and genetic 
medicines, the new biopharmaceutical companies had 
much stronger research capabilities for biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals and concentrated on the innovation of new 
biopharmaceuticals. Since the knowledge accumulation of these 
new biopharmaceutical SMEs was still too weak to compete 
with MNCs, they usually focused on the innovation of Me-too 
medicines, rather than new medicines. Furthermore, due to 
the smallness and limited marketing2 (8) capabilities of these 
new companies they usually targeted the sales of the domestic 
market (9). 
The companies of Chinese herbal medicines also made 
obvious progress during this period. While the majority of 
companies of Chinese herbal medicines still emphasized the 
manufacturing activities of traditional herbal medicines (10), 
some larger companies started to invest in the innovation of new 
herbaceous medicines. In addition, a group of new companies of 
Chinese herbal  medicines were set up in the late 1990s and at 
the beginning of the 2000s (9). Since these new companies were 
established, they emphasized the innovation of new herbaceous 
medicines. In fact, new companies and also larger ones of Chinese 
herbal medicines, had frequent interactions with academics. The 
main knowledge base of all these companies was the historical 
records of Chinese herbs. Modern biotechnology was mainly 
used by the companies to test the reliability of the historical 
records, to analyse the functional genes of herbs and to discover 
the effects of herbal genes on human cells. The new herbaceous 
2Me-too medicine in this article is defined as the medicine whose structure is very similar to the existing 
medicines but with minor differences (8). 
medicines usually used a single extract of a specific herb. Strict 
clinical trials were widely adopted in the innovation of new 
herbaceous medicines (11). However, due to the smallness and 
limited marketing capabilities of these companies, they usually 
targeted the demands of domestic market only.
While biotechnology gradually spilled over in the 
pharmaceutical sector, the two National Programs also tended 
to facilitate pharmaceutical companies to absorb biotechnology 
and to develop new medicines; yet, most of the pharmaceutical 
companies were quite indifferent to the two National Programs. 
Indeed, the two National Programs which targeted the new 
biotechnological or chemical pharmaceuticals did not fit the 
manufacturing business of the firms of intermediaries and generic 
medicine whose knowledge base was the chemical engineering. 
While the majority of these companies were not incentivized by 
the two National Programs to do pharmaceutical innovation, 
only few larger companies of intermediaries and generic 
medicines, which were willing to invest in the innovation of new 
or Me-too medicines, transferred biotechnologies funded by the 
two National Programs (12). For example, Taiwan Tong Yang, 
which was one of the largest companies of generic medicine in 
Taiwan, transferred Thalidomide (a new chemical medicine for 
anti-liver cancer) from the National Science and Technology 
Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals and continued 
doing Phase III clinical trials (12). Besides, it was in fact the 
new biopharmaceutical companies and the companies of 
Chinese herbal medicines to benefit most from the two National 
Programs. With stronger research capabilities these companies 
were more willing to transfer the biotechnologies funded by the 
two National Programs. For instance, Phyto Health and SunTen 
Pharmaceutical have cooperated in the innovation of PDC-
748 (a new herbaceous medicine of tussis) and received full 
funding from the National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals to continue Phase II 
clinical trials3. 
We have interviewed three pharmaceutical companies which 
transferred biotechnologies funded by the National Science and 
Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 
including one larger (SunTen Pharmaceutical) and one new 
company of Chinese herbal medicines (Pharmaceutical  SME B), 
as well as one new biopharmaceutical company (Pharmaceutical 
SME A). All of the companies which transferred biotechnologies 
supported by the National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals considered that the 
National Program positively encouraged them to cooperate 
with academics and positively increased their capabilities of 
innovation. However, besides SunTen Pharmaceutical which has 
not expressed its difficulties, the other two companies expressed 
that after they transferred the biotechnologies they found it very 
hard to continuously innovate the biopharmaceutical products 
due to the regulations. As described by the director of R&D of 
Pharmaceutical SME A (Intcomph3), the company transferred 
biotechnologies from the National Program for the innovation 
of new biopharmaceuticals, yet the regulatory body, the Bureau 
of Pharmaceutical Affairs under the Department of Health, 
which implemented the Law, was quite conservative to issue the 
company license for clinical trials. Furthermore, the president 
of R&D of another new company of Chinese herbal medicines 
(Intcomph4) expressed almost the same experience. The 
company transferred the biotechnologies funded by the National 
3See the Official website of SunTen Pharmaceutical: http://www.stpt.com.tw/eng 
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Table 1. The contents of two kinds of policies in Taiwan
Policy Names Policy Type Policy Contents
National Research Program for  Genomic Medicine R&D • Ministries: NSC (coordinator), MOEA, DOH 
• Year of promotion: 2002 
• Policy objectives: to ‘integrate limited resources, to capitalize the 
knowledge embodied in the human genome in order to promote medical 
research in Taiwan and also to act as an initiator for the local biomedical 
industry’ 
• Policy instruments: funding 
• Targets: the research of genetic therapies for cancers, infectious diseases 
and highly heritable diseases
National Science and  Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals
R&D • Ministries: NSC (coordinator), MOEA
• Year of promotion: 2000
• Policy objectives: to ‘gather all the allocated funding related to 
biotechnology and drug R&D of the National Science Council, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the Department of Health to integrate the co-
operation among industry, government, academics and the institutes’ 
• Policy instruments: funding 
• Targets: the research of new chemical medicines, new protein of 
pharmaceutical intermediaries, and new Chinese herbal medicines which 
may be able to heal the four diseases among Taiwanese citizens, including 
cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular, and neurological diseases
The Law of Pharmaceutical Affairs Regulation • Ministries: DOH (Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs)
• Year of promotion: 1970
• Policy objectives: to ‘regulate the safeties of pharmaceutical affairs’ 
• Policy instruments: penalties 
• Policy purpose of the new clauses: encourage innovation of new 
medicines
• Policy instruments of the new clauses: license and protection 
Abbreviation: NSC= the National Science Council, MOEA= the Ministry of Economic Affairs, DOH= the Department of Health
Table 2. Interviewees in Taiwan
Name Code Organization Position Dates of interviewing 
Elected politicians  
Lee, Chong-Chou Intex1 Science and Technology Advisory Group 
Director of Biotechnology 
Office 
20/01/2009
Anonymous Intex2 National Science Council Ex-minister 15/05/2008
Anonymous Intex3 Department of Health Ex-minister 23/10/2008
Anonymous Intex4 National Research Program for Genetic Medicine Leader 19/04/2010
Anonymous Intex5
National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals
Leader 30/10/2008
Administrators 
Anonymous Intad1 National Research Program for Genetic Medicine Project manager 13/04/2010
Anonymous Intad2
National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals
Officer 03/11/2008
Firms 
Hsu, Ming-Chu Intcomph1 Taigen Biotechnology Chief Executive Officer 20/04/2010
Anonymous Intcomph2 SunTen Pharmaceutical Ex-Chief Executive Officer 16/04/2010
Anonymous Intcomph3 Pharmaceutical SME A  Director, R&D 01/19/2009
Anonymous Intcomph4 Pharmaceutical SME B  President, R&D 03/02/2009
Academics 
Sun, Julie Intac1 Taiwan Institute of Economic Research  
Chief of Biotechnology 
Industry Study Center 
08/05/2008
Anonymous Intac2 Kaohsiung Medical University 
Professor of natural 
products
23/02/2009
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Program for the innovation of new herbaceous medicines. Yet, 
because the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs was conservative 
to issue the company license for clinical trials, the clinical trials 
of the company were slowed down.
The knowledge accumulation  and the academic community
The roles of universities dramatically changed after 2000. 
Before that, universities were not allowed to directly interact 
with pharmaceutical firms. Yet, after 2000, universities were 
encouraged by the policies, such as the National Programs, to 
transfer biotechnologies to pharmaceutical companies as much 
as possible. Since the majority of local pharmaceutical SMEs were 
too small to do pharmaceutical related research by themselves, 
universities in fact burdened the responsibilities to do the 
majority of research, including the research of small molecule 
medicine, biopharmaceuticals and Chinese herbal medicines. 
The majority of research topics were chosen according to the 
research interests of individual scientists. However, with the 
promotion of the two pharmaceutical National Programs, 
the scientists with related research interests were gradually 
encouraged to establish networks with each other and to join 
research which emphasized the targets of the two National 
Programs.      
Besides universities, the public research organizations under 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Department of Health 
were also involved in the innovation of biopharmaceuticals 
and tended to play intermediary roles between universities and 
pharmaceutical companies. All of these research organizations, 
including the Industrial Technology Research Institute, the 
DCB and the National Health Research Institute, tended to 
transform the basic research from the universities to become 
applied research, and quickly to transfer the applied research to 
the pharmaceutical companies.   
Even  if  the  two National  Programs have been directed 
to encourage academics within the universities to transfer 
biotechnologies to pharmaceutical companies as much as 
possible, not many academics were incentivized and the results 
of the majority of the research funded by the two National 
Programs remained in universities, rather than transferred 
to the pharmaceutical sector (as shown in the next section). 
As described by a professor of Chinese herbal medicines 
involved in the National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Intac2), the two National 
Programs incentivized some scientists to collaborate with 
each other and to join research projects which focused on the 
pharmaceutical research of the four selected diseases. Moreover, 
from his perspective the National Programs also aroused 
the entrepreneurships of some academics and increased the 
incentives of these academics to transfer their technologies to 
pharmaceutical companies. However, as described by the leader 
of the National Research Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4), 
besides a small group of scientists, many scientists funded by 
the National Program were more interested in pure academic 
research and were very reluctant to transfer their results to 
pharmaceutical companies. In other words, many academics 
were still not incentivized by the two National Programs to 
transfer the technology.
The roles of the government: the appropriateness of the 
National Programs and the Law 
In this section we discuss the roles of the Taiwanese government 
through analysing the appropriateness of the National Programs 
and the Law. The appropriateness in this article is defined as the 
RTDI policies that match the development of the NSTIS through 
supporting the underlying logic of knowledge accumulation 
and exploitation in a particular technological field, clustering 
the network of actors and encouraging the production and 
innovation of a particular set of products. In the following 
paragraphs we will discuss the appropriateness of the National 
Programs and the Law first, and the appropriateness of the two 
policies afterwards.          
The policy objectives and the policy instruments of the National 
Research Program for Genetic Medicine, as we are going to 
show below, were appropriate; yet, once being implemented, 
the National Program did not generate appropriate support to 
the biopharmaceutical NSTIS. As we have described in Table 1 
the policy objectives of the National Program were ‘to integrate 
limited resources’, ‘to capitalize on the knowledge embodied 
in the human genome’, and ‘to act as an initiator for the local 
biomedical industry’. However, the National Program which 
tended to ‘capitalize on the knowledge’ and ‘to act as an initiator 
for the local biomedical industry’ in fact tended to support the 
knowledge accumulation in genetic research and to cluster the 
networks between academics and companies. As the universities 
still did the majority of research and the local pharmaceutical 
SMEs lacked resources to fund their own innovations, the 
intended clustering of networks between the university and 
industry, in order to accelerate the technology diffusion from 
the universities to companies and to support the knowledge 
accumulation in the companies, was indeed appropriate for the 
Taiwanese biopharmaceutical NSTIS. The policy instruments 
which funded both universities and pharmaceutical companies 
to explore and accumulate knowledge of genetic therapies were 
also appropriate. 
Yet, the National Program was not effective. Because of the 
time-lags of the National Program, we are unable to observe 
the long-term effects of the National Program. However, some 
economic indicators, such as the number of papers publishes 
from the results of the projects funded by the National Program, 
are able to show short-term effects which are clearly caused 
by the National Program. These short-term effects are able 
to help us to observe the extent for the National Program to 
appropriately match the biopharmaceutical NSTIS. Table 3 
shows the economic index of the National Program published 
by the National Science Council in terms of papers published, 
patent applied, patent obtained, technology transfer, talents 
educated and number of pharmaceutical companies. On the 
basis of the statistical data shown in Table 3, in each year from 
2002 to 2007 the National Program only transferred 0 to 15 
biotechnologies to the pharmaceutical sector. The number 
of companies which transferred biotechnologies funded by 
the National Program only shared 0% to 4.6% of the total of 
pharmaceutical companies. Under the condition that more 
than 95% of pharmaceutical companies did not transfer 
biotechnologies funded by the National Program, it was hard 
for the National Program to claim that it was successful ‘to act 
as an initiator for the local biomedical industry’. Furthermore, 
from 2002 to 2007 in each year the National Program only 
obtained 3-11 patents. The extent for the National Program to 
‘capitalize on the knowledge embodies in the human genome’ 
was in fact very limited. Nevertheless, besides the quantitative 
economic index, we also collected some qualitative data through 
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Table 3. The performance of National Research Program for Genomic Medicine and numbers of pharmaceutical companies from 2002 to 2007
Year Papers published Patent applied Patent obtained Technology  transfer Talents educated Number of pharmaceutical companies
2002 86 3 3 0 299 425
2003 222 21 7 2 376 429
2004 354 48 9 5 419 414
2005 531 11 6 1 338 419
2006 216 7 10 10 600 328
2007 402 14 11 15 340 321
Sources: Science and Technology Yearbook (13),  Biotechnology Industry in Taiwan (from 2001 to 2009) 
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our interviews with the leader of the National Program (Intex4) 
and the project manager in the Office of the National Program 
(Intad1). According to the interviewees the National Program 
did encourage some scientists to do outstanding genetic 
research and encouraged a small group of scientists and a 
small number of pharmaceutical companies to collaborate with 
each other through technology transfer. In another words, the 
National Program, to some extent, appropriately encouraged 
the knowledge exploitation of biotechnology in universities and 
encouraged some academics and pharmaceutical companies to 
cluster networks. Although in the short term the economic index 
did not show the appropriateness of the National Program, in 
the long term the National Program may be able to appropriately 
support the development of biopharmaceutical NSTIS in the 
future. In summary, the policy objectives and policy instruments 
of the National Program were appropriate, yet after being 
implemented, at least in the short term, the National Program 
had very limited support to the biopharmaceutical NSTIS.
The policy objectives and policy instruments of the National 
Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and 
Pharmaceuticals, as shown below, were also appropriate; yet, 
the National Program generated very limited appropriate 
support for the development of biopharmaceutical NSTIS. 
As we have described in Table 1 the policy objectives of the 
National Program were to ‘gather all the allocated funding 
related to biotechnology and drug R&D’ of the three ministries 
and ‘to integrate the co-operation among industry, government, 
academics and the institutes’. As the modern biotechnology was 
developed through interactions of actors and both scientists and 
companies are important in the innovation of biotechnology, the 
National Program, which sought ‘to integrate the co-operation 
among industry, government, academics and the institutes’, in 
fact tended to cluster networks between different actors. The 
policy instruments of the National Program which funded 
both the academics and pharmaceutical companies in order 
to encourage interactions and the knowledge accumulation 
of biopharmaceuticals on both sides were also appropriate. 
However, on the basis of the quantitative economic index 
published in the Science and Technology Year Book (12), from 
2005 to 2007 the National Program has totally transferred 10 
biotechnologies to the pharmaceutical sector. The number of 
pharmaceutical companies which transferred biotechnologies 
funded by the National Program only weighted 4% of the total 
number of pharmaceutical companies. Under the condition 
that more than 95% of the pharmaceutical companies did not 
transfer technologies funded by the National Program, it was 
difficult for the National Program to claim that it successfully 
encouraged the cooperation between the academics and 
industry. Besides, we have collected the qualitative data through 
the interviews with the leader (Intex5), the officer of the National 
Program (Intad2), the pharmaceutical companies (Intcomph2, 
Intcomph3, Intcomph4) and the academic (Intac2) involved 
in the National Program. According to those interviewees, the 
National Program did encourage the collaboration between 
some academics and a small number of pharmaceutical 
companies. Even if in the short term the economic index did 
not show the appropriate effect, in the long term the National 
Program may be able to appropriately support the development 
of biopharmaceutical NSTIS. In sum, the policy objectives and 
policy instruments of the National Program were appropriate, 
but the National Program generated limited appropriate effect 
on the biopharmaceutical NSTIS, at least in the short term. 
The policy objective and the policy instruments of the Law, as 
we are going to show below, were inappropriate and only the 
policy purpose and the policy instruments of the new clauses 
of the Law were appropriate; once all clauses of the Law are 
implemented, the Law would not generate appropriate support 
to the biopharmaceutical NSTIS. The policy objective of the 
Law, as described in Table 1, which intended to ‘regulate the 
safeties of pharmaceutical affairs’ through penalties, in fact 
had no intention to support the knowledge accumulation, to 
cluster actors or to encourage the innovation of pharmaceutical 
products. The majority of the clauses of the Law were legislated 
in 1970 in order to control the manufacturing and the quality of 
medicines. From 1970 to 2000, the policy objective and the policy 
instruments of the Law were not changed. Only after 2000 the 
new clauses of the Law, such as pharmaceutical data exclusivity 
and the license for new medicines, were legislated to encourage 
local pharmaceutical companies to be involved in the innovation 
of new pharmaceuticals and new biopharmaceuticals. The policy 
purpose of the new clauses of the Law was appropriate, because 
the involvement of the pharmaceutical companies facilitated 
the knowledge diffusion of modern biotechnology in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Moreover, the policy instruments of the 
new clauses which licensed and protected the data exclusivity 
of the new pharmaceuticals and new biopharmaceuticals also 
encouraged the involvement of pharmaceutical companies in 
the innovation of modern biotechnology and were appropriate. 
Yet, once being implemented, according to the descriptions of 
the director of R&D of Pharmaceutical SME A and the president 
of R&D of Pharmaceutical SME B (Intcomph3, Intcomph4), the 
implementation body of the Law was conservative to issue the 
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license for clinical trials and to some extent, discouraged the 
pharmaceutical companies to innovate new pharmaceuticals. In 
other words, even if the policy purpose and policy instruments 
of the new clauses of the Law were appropriate, once being 
implemented, the new clauses did not appropriately support the 
development of the biopharmaceutical NSTIS. 
While the two National Programs and the Law were 
promoted together, according to our interviews with the 
three pharmaceutical companies which transferred the 
biotechnologies from the project funded by the two National 
Programs, the limited appropriateness of the two National 
Programs was, to some extent, reduced by the promotion of 
the Law. After the promotion of the two policies, the Taiwanese 
government in fact had no obvious appropriate support to the 
development of biopharmaceutical NSTIS. 
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